Abstract-This paper combines revealed preference and nonparametric estimation techniques to obtain nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility and demand functions over a population of heterogeneous households. Our approach is independent of any functional specification on the household utility functions. Our method applies the weak axiom of revealed preference to a population of heterogeneous households. Although this does not produce the sharpest bounds, we show that it is computationally attractive and provides narrow bounds. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results by applying it to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a U.S. cross-sectional consumption data set.
I. Introduction
W E present a framework to construct nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility function while taking into account individual unobserved heterogeneity. Our approach combines elementary revealed preference concepts, in particular the weak axiom of revealed preference, with nonparametric estimation techniques. In this manner, our approach remains independent of any parametric specification on the underlying household utility functions or the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. Although our procedure does not guarantee the sharpest results, we nevertheless show that it is powerful enough to establish narrow bounds. As such, we contribute to the literature by providing a procedure that is computationally efficient (at the cost of sharpness) and still produces informative results. We further demonstrate how the framework can be used to establish bounds on the distribution of the demand functions in counterfactual price regimes. An illustration using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a U.S. cross-sectional household consumption data set, demonstrates the practical usefulness of our results.
A. Motivation
Demand analysis provides a powerful tool to analyze behavioral responses and welfare effects due to price and income variations. In a typical demand study, the researcher first estimates the parameters of some parametric demand system, 1 and uses these estimates to calculate the associated indirect utilities. This parametric approach has two major shortcomings. The first is that the outcome is sensitive to the specific functional structure chosen by the researcher. Imposing the wrong functional form can therefore severely bias the resulting analysis. A second shortcoming concerns the treatment of individual (unobserved) heterogeneity. In a typical consumer data set, we observe individuals or households only once. Given this data limitation, it is often assumed that similar-looking individuals have similar preferences. Many demand studies therefore model a household's demand to equal a rational systematic component, from a common utility function across all (similar-looking) households, and a household-specific additive error term capturing the unobserved heterogeneity or taste variation. By controlling for various observable characteristics (like household size), it is hoped that the issue of heterogeneity across the households is adequately addressed by including such additive error term. This assumption, however, disregards the finding that individuals who look very similar may differ dramatically in their actual choice behavior. 2 As Lewbel (2001) showed, imposing additivity of the unobserved heterogeneity is a strong assumption. Its resulting implications come very close to enforcing a representative agent assumption. 3 To summarize, we see that different people (although they may look the same) have different tastes and consequentially behave differently. In order to take this into account, it is crucial to allow for nonadditive unobserved heterogeneity.
B. Literature Overview
In order to deal with the two problems noted, one can distinguish between two approaches. The first approach looks at the nonparametric differential smooth restrictions that can still be established in a heterogeneous population. These usually take the form of population-level generalizations of Slutsky symmetry, negativity, and homogeneity. Recent examples that follow this approach are Hoderlein (2011), Blundell, Horowitz, and Parey (2017) , Hausman and Newey (2016) , Hoderlein and Vanhems (2018) , Dette, Hoderlein, and Neumeyer (2016) , and Lewbel and Pendakur (2017) . Hausman and Newey (2016) , for instance, derive bounds on the average consumer surplus from bounds on income effects. In order to do this, they start from the Slutsky condition, which exploits smoothness of the underlying demand functions.
A second approach, followed in this paper, is to rely on revealed preference theory. Revealed preference theory was 350 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS initiated by Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) and further developed in several seminal contributions by Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1973) , and Varian (1982) . The main aim of revealed preference theory is to establish (combinatorial) restrictions on observed demand behavior of a certain individual or household such that it is consistent with the classical model of utility maximization subject to a budget constraint. One of the main advantages of revealed preference theory is that it imposes no functional restrictions on the underlying utility function, except for some regularity conditions like local nonsatiation.
Revealed preference theory, as it was initially developed, has two main problems. First, from an empirical point of view, the method does not really seem to provide very tight bounds. The main reason for this is that relative price variations usually tend to be quite small in comparison to income variation. This implies that budget hyperplanes often do not cross. We refer to Bronars (1987) and Varian (1982) for a discussion of this problem. The second problem is that revealed preference theory is not well suited to deal with unobserved individual heterogeneity. As a result, most of its applications remain confined to a few panel consumption data sets, where the same household or individual is observed over multiple periods.
The first problem has been the subject of several recent studies that apply revealed preference theory to repeated cross-sectional data by combining insights from revealed preference theory with nonparametric estimation techniques (see Blundell, 2005; Blundell, Browning, & Crawford, 2003 , 2008 and Blundell et al., 2015) . The main contribution from this literature is that it shows how to use nonparametric Engel curve demand estimates as an input for revealed preference analysis. If we assume that households in the same time period and location face the same relative prices, then the nonparametric Engel curves estimate the mean (or average) expansion paths for each price regime. The availability of these expansion paths greatly improves the nonparametric bounds on various welfare-related concepts and on the counterfactual demand estimates that can be obtained using revealed preference techniques.
A remaining drawback of this approach is the way it deals with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. Given that the Engel curve estimates are obtained from a mean regression, the methodology is subject to Lewbel's (2001) critique: imposing revealed preference restrictions on the mean Engel curve estimates comes very close to imposing a representative consumer assumption. Given this, the approach does not fully address the individual heterogeneity problem. Moreover, despite the fact that the procedure has the potential to produce tight bounds on the representative money metric utility and demand functions, it does not give us any information concerning the distribution of these functions across the heterogeneous population.
A useful extension of revealed preference theory that explicitly takes into account individual heterogeneity is stochastic revealed preference theory, initiated by McFadden and Richter (1971) and Falmagne (1978) . 4 We refer to McFadden (2005) for an overview of the literature. Stochastic revealed preference takes as input the entire distribution of demand behavior over a heterogeneous population of households for a finite number of budget sets. 5 Therefore, it is well suited to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. The literature has put forward several rationality axioms (e.g., the axiom of stochastic revealed preference and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference) that provide conditions on the distributions of choices such that a population of individuals is consistent with rational choice theory, which postulates that individuals are preference maximizers. Although the literature is mainly theoretical, several recent papers developed statistical tests to verify whether the stochastic revealed preference axioms are satisfied in reality. Hoderlein and Stoye (2014) derive a statistical procedure to infer bounds on the fraction of the population that violates the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference. Kitamura and Stoye (2013) derive a statistical test to verify whether a population of heterogeneous households satisfies the axiom of stochastic revealed preference for a finite collection of budget sets, thereby explicitly taking into account transitivity of the preference relations. Finally, Kawaguchi (2017) derives several procedures to test the validity of various axioms of stochastic revealed preference. Interestingly, these studies find little evidence that the stochastic revealed preference restrictions are violated. The main difference between these papers and ours is the focus. While the existing contributions mainly deal with testing whether the axioms imposed by the stochastic revealed preference literature hold, we are more interested in the restrictions that the stochastic revealed preference axioms impose on the resulting distribution of the money metric utility and demand functions. In the terminology of Varian (1982) , while the above papers deal with testing the theory, we concentrate on the recovery of the underlying structure of the model.
Another closely related paper is Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014) , who focus on the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in a two-goods setting. In particular, they tackle the problem of individual unobserved heterogeneity using nonparametric quantile demand estimates in combination with standard revealed preference tests (i.e., SARP). Hoderlein and Stoye (2015) recently showed that in a two-goods setting, imposing the usual revealed preference axioms on the quantile demands is equivalent to imposing the axiom of stochastic revealed preference on the entire data set. 6 The analysis of 4 See also Block and Marschak (1959), McFadden (1975) , Fishburn (1978 Fishburn ( , 1992 , Cohen (1980) , Barberá and Pattanaik (1986) , Fishburn and Falmagne (1989) , Cohen and Falmagne (1990) , Fishburn (1992) , and Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) for other contributions.
5 A second interpretation of stochastic revealed preference theory is that the demand behavior is generated by a single household with a random utility function. 6 In a two-goods setting, the analysis is simplified by the fact that the weak and strong axioms of (stochastic) revealed preference coincide. In other words, imposing transitivity implies no additional testable implications (see Rose, 1958) . Blundell et al. (2014) is based on an invertibility (monotonicity) condition on the unobserved heterogeneity term. In our framework, we abstain from imposing such condition.
C. Contribution
The main contribution of this paper is to derive nonparametric bounds on the money metric utility functions and the demand functions without imposing any functional structure on the household utility functions and the unobserved heterogeneity structure. As such, we avoid the problem that our results might be biased because of a wrong functional specification or because the households do not satisfy the representative agent condition. We establish our results by combining elementary stochastic revealed preference theory and nonparametric estimation techniques. Our framework allows us to derive bounds not only on the mean of the money metric utility and demand functions, but also on the entire distribution of these functions over the heterogeneous population. This provides important additional information concerning the distribution of welfare and demand over the population.
In order to obtain our results, we exploit the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) applied to a population of heterogeneous households. Although this axiom is weaker than the revealed preference axioms that exploit transitivity, in particular, the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP), we nevertheless show that it is powerful enough to establish narrow bounds. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results by applying it to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a U.S. cross-sectional consumption data set.
D. Outline
In section II, we set out our framework and present the necessary notation, concepts, and definitions for the paper. Section III establishes the theoretical results that provide the nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility function and the demand functions. Section IV contains our empirical application. We discuss estimation and statistical inference, and we present several results. Section V concludes and points toward future research.
II. Notation and Definitions
In this section, we set out our basic framework and introduce the notation and definitions that are needed in order to establish the results in the following sections.
We consider an economy with a large (infinite) number of households described by a probability space (J, Ω, P). Household h ∈ J is endowed with a utility function that we denote by u h (q h ; a h ). This function depends on a (column) vector of consumed goods q h ∈ R N + , where N is the number of goods and a vector of observable household-specific attributes a h (e.g., household composition). Unobserved preference heterogeneity is captured by the fact that u h depends on h. For a price vector p ∈ R N ++ and an expenditure level x ∈ R + , we denote by (p, x) , the budget set consisting of all bundles q such that pq ≤ x. In order to decide how much to consume, the household maximizes its utility function subject to a household budget constraint: 7
Utility functions are assumed to be strictly quasi-concave, locally nonsatiated, and twice continuously differentiable in q such that the demand functions are well defined and continuous in p and x and that the budget constraint is binding. We make the following independence assumption:
This condition says that conditional on all observable attributes, the unobserved heterogeneity is independent of prices and income. This "independence of budget sets" condition is common in the literature. 8 If we interpret unobserved heterogeneity as preference heterogeneity, it encompasses the idea, common in consumer demand, that preferences do not vary with prices and income. For notational convenience, we omit from now on the dependence on the observable attributes a, taking into account that every expression is valid conditional on a particular value of this vector.
For the remaining part of the paper, it will be more useful to work with the indirect utility function
, which gives the maximal utility that household h can obtain at prices p and income x. The indirect utility function is strictly increasing in the level of disposable income x. 9 If we invert v h (p, x) with respect to x, we obtain the expenditure function e h (p, u) , which gives the minimal outlay for household h to reach utility level u at prices p. Finally, using the expenditure function, we can define the money metric utility function;
The money metric utility μ h (p v , p t , x) gives the minimal level of expenditure necessary for household h at prices p v to be equally well off as in a situation with prices p t and income x. The money metric utility lies at the basis of most price and cost-of-living indices. 10 The analysis in the following sections depends on a simple revealed preference idea. Fix a household h and consider two 7 We abstract from the problem that households are typically composed of several individuals (Chiappori, 1988 (Chiappori, , 1992 Cherchye, De Rock, & Vermeulen, 2007) .
8 See for example, Lewbel (2001, equation 4) , Blundell et al. (2014, assumption A.1) , Bhattacharya (2015) , and Hausman and Newey (2016) . 9 A sufficient condition for strict monotonicity of the indirect utility function in the expenditure level is that the utility function is locally nonsatiated (see, e.g., proposition 3.D.3 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995) . 10 The most frequently used cost-of-living indices are presented in section 1 of the online supplement.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS distinct budgets (p t , x) and (p v , y).
If the household is utility maximizing, then the following condition must hold:
( 1) The reasoning behind the condition is simple. If x ≥ p t q h (p v , y), then the chosen bundle q h (p v , y) at the budget (p v , y) was also feasible when q h (p t , x) was chosen. Given that the household h is utility maximizing and that the budget sets are distinct, it follows that
It is easy to see that condition (1) implies the weak axiom of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1938) , which states that for any two distinct budgets (p t , x) and (p v , y),
( 2 )
III. Nonparametric Bounds
In this section we show how to use basic revealed preference restrictions, in particular condition (1), together with information on the distribution of q h (p t , x), in order to establish bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility function and the demand function. As a first partial result, we demonstrate the possibility of obtaining bounds on the proportion of households in the economy that prefer a certain budget over another.
We start from the observational restrictions imposed by a repeated cross-sectional household consumption data set, where different households face the same prices in each crosssection. This gives us a data structure with a limited set of price regimes and, for each price regime, a large number of consumption bundles obtained from a random sample of households in the economy. We denote by T = {1, . . . , |T |} the set of cross-sections. The price vector corresponding to cross-section t ∈ T is denoted by p t .
Given that different households face distinct expenditure levels, we observe in each cross-section the distribution of demand bundles q t,h = q h (p t , x h ). Given the independence assumption above, we can, moreover, obtain the distribution of the vector q h (p t , x) for any expenditure level x and any cross-sectional price p t by conditioning on these variables: 11
We assume that the random vector q h (p t , x) has a continuous density function that is strictly positive on its domain. We use the notation Pr[A] as a shorthand for the following probability, of the households for which the statement A holds. Equivalently, it gives us the probability that A holds for a household h drawn at random from the population. We require sufficient variation of preferences and demand such that for any two distinct budgets
This will allow us to freely interchange strict and weak inequalities within the function Pr [.] .
A. The Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference
In order to give the main intuition behind the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference, we start by providing a graphical illustration for a two-goods setting. Figure 1 shows two budget lines (p t , x) and (p v , y). We denote the fraction of households in the population that consume on the dashed portion of the budget line (p v , y), that is, on line segment (A, B), by r t,v (x, y) . By a simple revealed preference argument (see condition 1), we see that all of these households must prefer the budget (p t , x) over the budget (p v , y). Likewise, the fraction of households in our population that consume on the dashed-line segment (C, A) of budget (p t , x), which we denote by r v,t (y, x) , all prefer the budget (p v , y) over (p t , x). By condition (2), no household can be simultaneously on both dashed-line segments. Otherwise, we would have that this household prefers x) . From this, it follows that the sum of the two fractions r t,v (x, y) and r v,t (y, x) is not larger than 1. This restriction is known in the literature as the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP).
The WASRP can be generalized to more than two goods. Toward this end, take two budgets (p t , x) and (p v , y). Given that all households are rational, we know from condition (1) that for all households h,
Integrating both sides gives
353 where we defined
. This inequality provides a lower bound on the fraction of households that prefer the budget (p t , x) over the budget (p v , y) (i.e., the fraction of households on the line segment A, B in figure 1 ). Given inequality (3), and the fact that
we immediately obtain the upper bound:
For both lower and upper bounds to be valid, it should be the case that for all cross-sections t, v ∈ T and all expenditure levels x, y,
which is the WASRP applied to our setting (see Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik, 1999 , 2002 , 2004 and Matzkin, 2007 , for a similar inequality).
In the remaining part of this section, we use the WASRP in order to obtain bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility and demand functions. This may pose a problem if the WASRP is violated. In such case, it may seem reasonable to relax the rationality assumptions imposed on the population, that is, weaken assumption (2). Section 3 in the online supplement presents two possible ways of doing this.
The WASRP exploits only the fact that individuals have no preference reversals (i.e., they satisfy WARP). Although WARP is a necessary consequence of rational consumption behavior, it is not the strongest condition. In order to obtain the sharpest restrictions, individuals in the population must show behavior that is in agreement with the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) (see Houthakker, 1950) . Imposing a SARP-based analysis in a setting with unobserved preference heterogeneity leads to the so-called axiom of revealed stochastic preference (ARSP), introduced by McFadden and Richter (1971) . The verification of the ARSP is computationally very difficult, that is, NP-hard (see also Kitamura & Stoye, 2013 , for a discussion). Our focus on the WASRP (instead of the ARSP) is mainly driven by the search for a procedure that is both computationally efficient and still produces informative results.
However, the emphasis on computable necessary conditions does not make our approach less interesting. The main focus of this paper is on obtaining bounds on the distribution of the money metric and demand functions in the population. In this respect, we take rationality of the population as an identifying assumption rather than treating it as an assumption that is subject to empirical testing (which has been the subject of several other recent papers: Hoderlein & Stoye, 2014; Kawaguchi, 2017; Kitamura & Stoye, 2013) . Additionally, it is questionable whether a SARP-based approach would greatly improve our bounds. Simulation results by Blundell et al. (2015) show that imposing SARP instead of WARP does not necessarily improve revealed preference bounds by a lot. Moreover, in section 4 of the online appendix, we present a procedure that allows us to incorporate some transitivity notions in the computation of the bounds. When implementing this computationally more intensive procedure, however, we found that the bounds improve only marginally. Given this, we abstained from using them in our application. Finally, we mention that the focus on WARP instead of SARP is not uncommon in the revealed preference literature (see, e.g., Blundell et al., 2008; Hoderlein & Stoye, 2014; .
B. Bounds on Money Metric Utility
We now show how to use inequality (3) to bound the distribution of the money metric utility function μ h (p t , p 0 , x 0 ) for some price vectors p 0 and p t corresponding to the prices of two cross-sections in the data set and for a particular level of income x 0 .
Before we give the technical details, we provide some intuition. Figure 2 presents an illustration of the construction of the upper and lower bound on the πth quantile of the money metric: What amount of money m t (π) should we give the households in our population such that a fraction π of this population prefers the budget (p t , m t (π)) over the budget (p 0 , x 0 )? In order to find an upper bound on the quantile, denoted by h t (π), we shift the budget line with slope p t such that exactly a fraction π of the population is on the dashed line segment, (A, B) of the budget line (p 0 , x 0 ). Inequality (3) guarantees that at least a fraction π of the population prefers
is an upper bound on m t (π). Next, in order to obtain a lower bound on the πth quantile, which we denote by t (π), we shift the budget with slope p t such that exactly a fraction (1 − π) is on the dashed portion of the budget line (p t , t (π))-line segment (C, D) . Again, using inequality (3), we know that at least a fraction (1 − π)
As an additional interpretation of the bounds, notice that h t (π) is equal to the income that should be given to all 354 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS households such that a fraction π of the households revealed prefers budget (p t , h t (π)) over the budget (p 0 , x 0 ). Given that "revealed preference" implies "actual preference," we have that h t (π) ≥ m t (π). The more the revealed preferences agree with the true preferences, the closer the bound h t (π) will be to the true money metric m t (π). From an empirical point of view, the revealed preferences approximate the true preferences better when the WASRP condition is tighter. As such, the tighter the WASRP condition (i.e., the closer r t,v (x, y) + r v,t (y, x) is to 1), the tighter the bounds. In fact, a violation of the WASRP will lead to a situation where the upper bound h t (π) is below the lower bound t (π).
Let us now formalize this reasoning for constructing the bounds. Fix a cross-sectional price vector p 0 and an income level x 0 . For any number π ∈ (0, 1) and any cross-section t ∈ T , let h t (π) be the πth quantile of the variable p t q h (p 0 , x 0 ):
From inequality (3), we know that π is lower than the fraction of households that prefer the budget (p t , h t (π)) over the budget (p 0 , x 0 ):
The second line is obtained by inverting the indirect utility function v h (p t , h t (π)) with respect to its second argument. This can be done by the fact that the indirect utility function is strictly increasing in income.
As above, let m t (π) be the quantile function of μ h (p t , p 0 , x 0 ), that is, for all π ∈ (0, 1),
Then, using our previously established result, we have that
The last line uses the assumption that the cumulative distribution function of μ h (p t , p 0 , x) is strictly increasing on its support. This result shows that h t (π) is an upper bound on the πth quantile of the distribution of the money metric utility function. Let us now focus on the lower bounds. For π ∈ (0, 1), let t (π) solve
The first inequality follows from inequality (3). As before, let m t (π) be the πth quantile of the distribution of the money metric utility μ h (p t , p 0 , x 0 ). We have that
This shows that t (π) is a lower bound for the quantile m t (π).
Using these upper and lower bounds on the quantiles, we can also derive an upper and lower bound on the mean value of the money metric utility. 
C. Bounds on Demand Functions
Let us now demonstrate how to use our framework in order to establish bounds on the quantiles of the demand functions for unobserved, counterfactual price regimes p 0 and expenditure levels x 0 (i.e., p 0 does not necessarily correspond to a price vector of a certain cross-section).
Again, we start by giving some intuition. Consider the two goods setting in figure 3 . Fix a budget (p 0 , x 0 ) and assume we would like to bound the πth quantile of the consumption of good 2: What is the level of q 2 such that a fraction π of the population consumes no more than q 2 when confronted with the budget (p 0 , x 0 )? The main problem here is that the distribution q h (p 0 , x 0 ) is not observed, as p 0 does not correspond to the price of any cross-section. Let us first focus on the upper bound, illustrated on the left panel of the figure. Take a cross-sectional price p t the slope of which is steeper than p 0 . Now, let us shift the budget with slope p t such that exactly a fraction π of the population consumes on the dashed portion (B, D) of this budget line. From section IIIB, we know that this happens at expenditure level t (1 − π)). Then, using the WASRP, we know that at most, a fraction 1 − π consumes on the line segment (A, B) of the budget (p 0 , x 0 ). Equivalently, at least a fraction π of the population must consume on the segment (B, C) of this budget line. As such, we have thatq 2 is an upper bound on the πth quantile of good 2. Of course, p t was arbitrarily chosen from the set of prices that are steeper than p 0 . Given this, we should minimize this upper bound over all cross-sectional prices with a steeper slope.
The construction of a lower bound is illustrated in the right panel of figure 3 . The construction is similar to the left panel except that now we construct an upper bound on the (1 − π)th quantile of the consumption of good 1. Given that there are only two goods, this also provides a lower bound on the consumption of good 2. Observe that the construction uses a cross-sectional price level p v which is flatter than the slope p 0 . As such, we should choose from this set the cross-section that produces the highest lower bound. Now let us formalize the above intuition. Consider a function f : R n + → R : q → f (q). We are interested in providing an upper bound on the quantiles of the distribution of the random variable f (q h (p 0 , x 0 )). The function f (.) encompasses various interesting measures. For example, if we want to bound the expenditure share on one of the goods, we can use the function f (q) = 1 x 0 p 0,j q j , where p 0,j is the price of good j in vector p 0 , q j is the quantity of good j in vector q, and x 0 is the expenditure level. In addition, the focus on upper bounds is not restrictive given that we can always use information on upper bounds to construct lower bounds. As an example, we can establish a lower bound on the πth quantile of f (q) = 1 x 0 p 0,j q j by constructing an upper bound on the
For every cross-section t, we previously defined the value t (1 − π) as the expenditure level that satisfied the following condition:
The value of t (1 − π) can be obtained using information on x 0 , p 0 and the distribution of q h (p t , x) alone, which we assume to be known. For the next step, we use the WASRP, which requires that
Let m(π) be the πth quantile of the distribution function of the random variable f (q h (p 0 , x 0 )). We have that
The first inequality follows from the WASRP. The definition of r t,0 immediately gives the second equality. The last inequality follows from the fact that whenever
≤ p t q and p 0 q = x 0 must also hold. In order to see this, assume on the contrary that f (q h (p 0 , x 0 )) is larger than f (q) for all vectors q where p 0 q = x 0 and
The above derivation shows that
for all cross-sections t. In practice, we compute this righthand side for every cross-section t and then take the lowest value across all cross-sections as the upper bound. If f is a linear function, then the right-hand side is a simple linear programming problem that can be solved very efficiently. If we go back to the left panel of figure 3 , we see that the set
corresponds to the line segment (B, C). The highest value of good 2 in this set gives the upper boundq 2 . Given these bounds on the quantiles of the demand functions, we can compute bounds on the mean demand by using a similar procedure as for the money metric utility function.
IV. Application
In this section, we discuss the empirical implementation of the theoretical bounds that were established in section III. First, we present an estimation procedure for the measures r t,v (x, y), t (π), and h t (π). We also provide a procedure to take into account the endogeneity of the expenditure 356 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS level. Subsequently, we introduce our sample from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Finally, we present some empirical results.
A. Estimation Procedure
The construction of the bounds in the previous section assumed that we know the distribution of the variables q h (p t , x) for every cross-sectional price p t and every income level x. Given these distributions, it is fairly easy to obtain the quantities r t,v (x, y) = Pr x ≥ p t q h (p v , y) , which form the main building blocks for our bounds. In practice, however, these probabilities need to be estimated. We propose a kernel estimator.
Consider the vth cross-section, v ∈ T . Assume that this cross-section contains a sample of n observed household demand bundles {q v,i } i≤n where i corresponds to a particular observation. We denote by {y v,i } i≤n the expenditure levels corresponding to observation i in cross-section v. We assume that the sample {q v,i } i≤n is i. 
Here we used the identity p v s v = 1 and the fact that, conditional on y v = y, q v = ys v .
The variable r t,v (x, y) can be estimated using a standard Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression of the dependent variable 1[(xp v − yp t )s v,i ] on the expenditure level y v,i , giving fitted valuesr t,v (x, y). The estimators for h t (π) and t (π) are then determined as the solution to the following equations:
These values can be found using standard binary search algorithms. In order for this algorithm to work, we assume thatr 0,t (x 0 ,ˆ t (π)) is decreasing inˆ t (π). This assumption is (asymptotically) valid if all goods are normal (i.e., all demand functions are increasing in income). 13 Section V in the online supplement shows the consistency and asymptotic normality of these estimators. The estimators for the bounds on the demand functions are computed by substituting the estimated valuesˆ t (π) for the 13 See also for a similar assumption. values of t (π) in the linear programming problems. Consistency of these estimates is obtained from the continuous mapping theorem. Given that our bounds are based on finite sample estimates, we are confronted with the issue of statistical inference. Construction of confidence intervals is briefly discussed in section 6 of the online supplement.
Endogeneity. Total expenditure may be endogenous. Total expenditure not only affects the desired consumption shares, but, given that total expenditure is defined as the sum of expenditures on the different goods, measurement error in consumption also leads to measurement error in total expenditure. Additionally, total expenditure may be correlated with preferences (e.g., households with higher and lower total expenditure may have different preferences).
In order to control for endogeneity of the expenditure level, we adapt our estimation using a control function approach. As is usual in the literature, we use equivalent labor income, denoted by w, as an instrument for total expenditure y. 14 The use of labor income to control for unobserved preference heterogeneity seems reasonable if expenditures are separable from labor supply in the utility function. 15 In order to estimate r t,v (x, y), we follow a control function approach suggested by Blundell and Powell (2003) and Imbens and Newey (2009) . 16 Define g(y, h) Blundell and Powell (2003) and Imbens and Newey (2009) call G(y) the average structural function of g. In order to estimate G(y), they propose a control function approach. Assume that the log of total expenditure can be expressed as the sum of some unknown function ϕ(·) of the log of labor income ln(w) and an error term η:
The error term η captures the part of ln(y) that is left unexplained by labor income w (the difference between ln(y) and the expectation of ln(y) conditional on w). Additionally, we assume that preference heterogeneity, captured by h, is distributed independent of expenditure y, when conditioning on η:
Finally, we assume that the support of the random variable η is independent of the value of y. In this case, we have that
Also,
In practice, we first obtain the fitted residualsη v,i from the (nonparametric) regression of ln( y v,i ) on ln(w v,i ). Subsequently, we estimate G * ( y, η i,v ) nonparametrically using a kernel regression producing estimatesĜ * ( y,η v,i ). Finally, we obtain an estimate of G( y) by taking the average over all estimates from the previous step:
B. Data Description
We illustrate our approach by using a data sample from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), a repeated crosssection. We use data on consumption decisions by U.S. households from 1994 to 2007 (fourteen years). It is important to note that the consumer expenditures are derived from the diary survey, not from interview data. The diary data seem well suited for (static) demand analysis. First, given that we focus on nondurable consumption, which is customary in static demand analysis, information on the purchase of big, durable items is unnecessary. Second, for nondurable commodities, the diary survey invites respondents to indicate their consumption in a two-week period. Because this period is relatively short, respondents should be able to recall their expenditures. We follow Blundell et al. (2008) by focusing our attention on three broad expenditure categories: food, other nondurables, and services. 17 As the diary survey reports expenditures on a two-week basis, we convert these to yearly equivalents. Observations with negative total expenditures are dropped. We also take into account that variation in expenditures can be driven by the household composition (e.g., the number of adults or the number of children living in the family). Therefore, we deflate total expenditure as well as total income by an OECD equivalence scale. Finally, we convert two-week expenditures to yearly data, which poses an important problem of seasonality. Therefore, we deseasonalize using a dummy regression approach. Although this imposes some more structure on the data, it allows us to maximize our sample size. 18 Price information is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. (More details on the commodities in our sample and the deseasonalization procedure are provided in section 2 of the online supplement. Robustness results without the deseasoning procedure can be found in section 7 of the online supplement.)
For the empirical analysis, we restrict attention to (a) households that have completed the two-week diary, (b) households that are not living in student housing, (c) households that are vehicle owners (to include fuel expenses), (d) households where both members work at least 17 hours a week, (e) households in which both members are not selfemployed, (f) households in which the age of the reference person is at least 21, and finally we restrict attention to (g) households that consist of a husband, a wife, and, possibly, children. As a final step, we also remove some outlier observations. 19 On average, we are left with 2,163 observations per cross-section with a minimum of 1,775 observations in 1994 and a maximum of 2,379 observations in 2007.
The left panel of Figure 4 plots the evolution of the mean consumption shares of the three goods over the considered periods. The right panel of figure 4 gives the variation in the relative prices, where prices normalized at the 1994 level.
C. Empirical Results
In this section, we provide the results of several exercises. Due to limited space, we need to restrict our analysis to some particular base years and some reference income levels. We will provide additional results upon request.
Bounds on the mean cost of living. We first show how our bounds perform with respect to the computation of the mean of the Laspeyres-Konüs cost-of-living index:
The Laspeyres-Konüs price index measures the income that one would need, relative to the income in period 0, in order to be equally well off as in the initial period. We take 1994 as the reference year, which means that p 0 corresponds to the price vector in 1994. We choose x 0 as the (OECD equivalence scale deflated) median expenditure level in 1994. The bounds on the cost of living that we obtain using our procedure are given in the last column of table 1. The table also reports values for various other price indices like the Laspeyres (L), the Paasche (P), and the Tornqvist price index (T). We also provide information on three other nonparametric bounds: the Lerner bounds and bounds by Pollak (1971) and . 20 The second-to-last column gives the bounds that are obtained by using the procedure set out by . This method first estimates nonparametric Engel curves and subsequently uses these estimates in combination with revealed preference restrictions to establish nonparametric bounds. We emphasize that there is a clear conceptual difference between the bounds of Blundell et al. (2003) (and Pollak) and ours. Their procedure provides bounds on the cost of living that correspond to some "representative household" whose demand functions equal the mean demand function over the population. . Finally, the bounds by Pollak (1971) . population. Although in our case, both procedures give similar results, this does not have to be the case in general. One partial explanation for this fact might be that the distribution of the cost of living over the households is quite symmetric (see below). Moreover, we show in our next exercise that the cost of living for particular households (e.g., households at the 10th or 90th percentile) may diverge considerably from the mean cost of living. Also notice that the bounds for both the BBC approach and our approach are quite narrow. This shows that although we relax the representative agent assumption, we are still able to get fairly reliable results.
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Distribution of the cost of living. We now look at the bounds on the quantiles of this cost-of-living index over the population, a feature that is identifiable only using our results. Figure 5 provides upper and lower bounds on the quantiles of the Laspeyres-Konüs cost of living index, for the 10th (dashed), 50th (solid), and 90th (dotted) percentile. Again the base year is 1994, and the reference income is given by the table 1 , we saw that the bounds on the mean price index were quite narrow. This narrowness is also found for the bounds on the quantiles, as can be seen from figure 5. The width of the distribution for a particular year depends to a large extent on the difference in relative slopes between the base year (p 0 /x 0 ) and the evaluation year (p t /x t ). The closer the relative prices, the narrower the difference is between the largest and smallest cost of living for the particular year. The reason is that the distribution is naturally bounded between the minimum and maximum values of y/x 0 for which the budget hyperplanes corresponding to (p t , y) and (p 0 , x 0 ) do not intersect. We see that the distribution is narrow in the year 2000 and the widest in the year 2002, giving differences in cost of living up to more than 5 percentage points between the 10th and 90th percentiles. One noticeable feature about the figure is that there seems to be a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the population, although the width of the distribution remains more or less constant for the latter five years. (Confidence intervals, and estimates for other quantiles, based on a subsampling procedure are given in section 6 of the online appendix. Section 7 of the online appendix also shows figure 5 when the reference income is not the median expenditure level in 1994 but the 10th or 90th percentile.) Figure 6 gives another illustration of the kinds of questions that can be answered given the framework in this paper. The figure gives bounds on the average of the Laspeyres-Konüs cost of living for different starting quantiles:
Here, x 0,i represents the income at the ith quantile of the income distribution in 1994, p 0 are the prices in 1994, and p t is the price vector for 2007. The figure gives an idea of the average price increase (over the heterogeneous population) for households starting at different quantiles of the income distribution in 1994. On average, one sees an increase over the quantiles, which means that on average, the cost of living for households starting at the lower end of the income distribution in 1994 was lower than for households starting at the higher end of the income distribution. In other words, the households that started at the lower end of the income distribution had (on average) a lower increase in the cost of living. Also, notice that the upper bound for the lowest quantile is below the lower bound for the upper quantile. This shows that the average cost-of-living values are significantly different (although the numbers are very close to each other in absolute terms). Figure 7 shows the distribution of the compensating variation:
Distribution of the compensating variation.
Here, x 0 is taken to be the median income in 2000, and x t is the median income in cross-section t. This compensating variation gives the difference between the median income in year t and the minimum income that would be necessary in order to obtain the welfare level at budget (p 0 , x 0 ). Values above 0 indicate a welfare gain for a household at the median income in the year t compared to a household at the median income in the year 2000. We see that all quantiles are below 0 for the years 1994 to 1999 and 2001 and quantiles are above 0 for the years 2005 to 2007. Once again, there seems to be quite a lot of heterogeneity present in the population. For many years, the range between the 10th and 90th percentile was around $400 per year, which is substantial. The large increase in 2005 is mainly due to a sharp increase in the median expenditure level that year.
Distribution of demand.
As a last exercise, we look at the bounds on the demanded consumption shares for counterfactual price regimes. To keep focus, we restrict ourselves to the computation of bounds for the own price effect for the food aggregate. We construct normalized prices by dividing 360 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS all cross-sectional prices by the median income in the corresponding year, and we take the mean of these normalized prices as a reference point. The reference income level x 0 is set at 1. We let the price for food range from 0.9 times its reference level to 1.05 times its reference level. The prices of all others goods are held constant. Figure 8 presents the results for three quantiles: the 10th (dashed), the median (solid), and the 90th (dotted). Again we see a lot of heterogeneity in the demand curves over the population, although the price responses look very similar across the three quantiles. As is customary in revealed preference analysis, it is possible to construct bounds on the counterfactual demands for prices only in the convex hull of the observed prices. This explains the large and simultaneous drop of all lower bounds at the 3% price increase and the large and simultaneous jump of all upper bounds when prices are 6% below the reference level.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we used elementary revealed preference techniques together with nonparametric estimation techniques in order to bound the distribution of the money metric utility and the demand functions over a population of heterogeneous households. Our methodology has two attractive features. First, the results are entirely nonparametric, which means that they are independent of any functional form imposed on the underlying utility functions. Second, we impose minimal conditions on the structure of the individual, unobserved heterogeneity. When we apply our techniques to data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, we find that our method generates narrow and informative bounds on the quantiles of the money metric utility function. Our results also demonstrate that individual heterogeneity creates considerable variation in welfare between households in the population (conditional on the same level of expenditure). Furthermore, we demonstrate how our results can be used to obtain informative bounds on the distribution of the demand functions in counterfactual price-income situations.
There are several avenues for follow-up research. First, we only briefly touched on the highly relevant topic of statistical inference (see also section 6 in the online supplement). However, given that our data are obtained from a random sample, measurement error and small sample biases influence our bounds, and statistical inference becomes relevant. Second, one may wonder how our methodology extends to discrete choice settings. One way to incorporate discrete choices would be to consider a setting where individuals make discrete choices in addition to continuous choices. Many of the results from this paper readily extend to such a setting. Alternatively, one could imagine a setting where all choices are discrete (see Manski, 2007 and Sher et al., 2011 , for a theoretical account of stochastic revealed preferences recovery in such setting). It would be interesting to see how the methodology developed in this paper transfers to such discrete choice setting. Third, future research could investigate how other (stricter) stochastic revealed preference axioms that explicitly take into account transitivity may even further improve our bounds. Fourth, our methodology requires that we know the demand for all goods that a household buys. If some goods are missing from the survey, we are confronted with missing goods or prices. For such instances, Varian (1988) proved that any observed consumption behavior can be made consistent with the maximization of some (well-behaved) utility function. 21 Finally, it would be interesting to extend the methodology to incorporate models with household production. In our setting, price increases can only harm consumers. When households are both consumers and producers of the commodities, price variation may create both winners and losers (see, e.g., Deaton, 1989) . This may lead to applications in which welfare effects are more heterogeneous across the population.
